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The Legal Character of Provincial Agreements 
with Foreign Governments 
Gibran van E R T 
The object of this article is to consider the legal character of provin-
cial agreemenss with foreign governments and the constitutional author-
ity of provincial governments to make them. The matter is controversial ; 
Quebec has long maintained that provincial governments are ccmpetent 
to conclude treaties in areas of provincial jurisdiction, while the federal 
government asserss that it alone can conclude binding treaties. The argu-
ment of this essay is that the traditional argumenss made for and against 
provincial competence to conclude treaties are equally unsatisfying. The 
best answer comes from a close analysss of the unwritten constitution 
from which the treaty power arises. Such analysis suggesss that the oth-
erwise credible argument, that the treaty-makinl power has ddvolved 
uniquely upon the federal government by a crystallization of ccnstitu-
tional usage into constitutional law, is blocked by Quebec's persistent 
objections over nearly forty years. Thus, the legal quesiion of capacitt to 
conclude treaties remains unresolved and indeed irresolvable without 
political dialogue. Finally, the article suggesss that even if provincss do 
not have the power to make binding treaties, courts may nevertheless use 
provincial agreements with foreign governments, in the proper case, as a 
guide to the construction of legislation. 
BA (McGill), BA (Cantab.), LLM (Toronto). I am indebted to : Wayne Clifford, Assis-
tant Deputy Minister, International Relations Section, Ministry of International and In-
tergovernmental Relations, Alberta ; David Gamache Hutchison, Researcher for US/ 
Latin America in the Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Affairs, Alberta ; 
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L'article explore le caractère légal des ententes entre les provinces et 
des gouvernements étrangess ainsi que le pouvorr éventuel des gouverne-
ments provinciaux de conclure parellles ententes en vertu de la Constitu-
tion. Le sujet est controversé. Le Québec soutient depuis longtemps que 
les gouvernements provinciaux peuvent conclure des traités dans des do-
maines de compétence provinciale. Par contre, le gouvernement fédéral 
affirme être le seul à pouvorr conclure des traités ayant force de loi. La 
thèse soutenee ici est la suivanee : les traditionnels argumenss pour ou 
contre la compétence des provinces en cetee matière sont tous 
insatisfaisants. La meilleuee solution consiste à analyser en ppofondeur 
la constitution non écrite, d'où émane le pouvorr relatif aux traités. Or, 
l'analyse montre que le Québec réfute inlassablement depuis plus de qua-
rante ans l'argument—au demeurant crédible — d'un pouvorr dévolu ex-
clusivement au gouvernement fédéral par la cristallisation de llusage 
constitutionnel dans le droit constitutionnel. La quesiion reste donc sans 
réponse sur le plan légal et sera impossible à résoudre sans dialogue po-
litique. L'auteur suggère en conclusion que, même si les provincss n'ont 
pas le pouvoir de conclure des traités exécutoires, les tribunaux peuvent 
malgré tout utiliser les ententes conclues entre les provinces et les gou-
vernements étrangers, s'il y a lieu, pour élaborer les lois. 
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Foreign affairs is ordinarily thought of as a power of the federal gov-
ernment. This is largely accurate. The vast majority of transactions between 
Canada and foreign states are conducted by federal ministries, principally 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Yet Canada's 
provincial governments also make occasional appearances on the interna-
tional stage. A few have permanent departments dedicated to international 
affairs'. Several have missions abroad2. Most send ministers and civil ser-
vants to meetings with foreign leaders and international organizations. And 
all have concluded, and continue to conclude, agreements between their 
provinces and the governments of foreign states. 
The object of this essay is to consider the legal character of these 
agreements and the constitutional authority of provincial governments to 
make them. The question is one of some controversy, for the power to 
conclude treaties is one which has fallen between the cracks of the Consti-
tution Acts. The treaty power was not apportioned to either order of gov-
ernment in 1867, for it was anticipated that Canada's international relations 
would continue to be conducted by the Imperial authorities in London. Nor 
was the matter clarified upon Canada's assumption of international legal 
personality with the Statute of Westminster 1931. This is not to say that 
there is no law here. Constitutional law, like nature, abhors a void : here as 
in so many other places, the unwritten constitution has supplied the writ-
ten constitution's deficiencies — though not, in this case, without contro-
versy. The Government of Quebec has long maintained that provincial 
governments are constitutionally competent to conclude treaties in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction. Other provinces have not made the point as 
strongly, yet they have not hesitated to initiate, negotiate and conclude in-
ternational agreements without federal involvement. The federal govern-
ment recognizes the existence of such agreements, but denies that they 
constitute treaties at international law. How courts may use these agree-
1. Quebec has a Ministère de relations internationales dedicated to international relations, 
including federal-provincial relations. Likewise, Alberta has a Ministry of International 
and Intergovernmental Affairs. Other provinces — British Columbia, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Nova Scotia (where the premier also serves as intergovernmental affairs min-
ister), and New Brunswick — include international relations within their intergovernmen-
tal affairs department without acknowledging the international role in the department's 
name. Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland deal with international and intergovern-
mental matters at cabinet level. Ontario has an international relations office within its 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. 
2. See the discussion in Gordon Mace, «Canada's Provinces and Relations with Latin 
America : Quebec, Alberta, and Ontario » in J. HAAR and E.J. DOSMAN, eds,, A Dynamic 
Partnership : Canada's Changing Role in the Hemisphere (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1993), p. 61, pp. 62-67. 
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ments, be they treaties or something less, has yet to be considered judi-
cially or in the academic literature. 
These are the issues to be considered here. I begin by reviewing pro-
vincial practice in concluding international agreements, focusing on some 
recent international activities by Alberta. I then introduce the treaty-mak-
ing power from the vantage point of international law. Next I describe the 
legal arguments for and against provincial competence to conclude trea-
ties. Concluding that these arguments are equally unsatisfying, I turn for 
answers to Canadian jurisprudence and finally to the unwritten constitu-
tion from which the treaty power arises. I conclude that there would be a 
credible argument that treaty-making authority has devolved uniquely upon 
the federal government by a crystallization of constitutional usage into 
constitutional law, were it not for Quebec's persistent objection. Given its 
objection, no such unwritten law can have developed and the legal ques-
tion of capacity to conclude treaties remains unresolved and indeed 
irresolvable without political dialogue. But that is not the end of the mat-
ter, for I go on to consider what use domestic courts can make of provin-
cial international agreements, even if they are not strictly treaties. I 
conclude that provincial agreements with foreign states are properly sus-
ceptible to an interpretive presumption that while not granting them the 
bindingness of treaties nonetheless accords them some legal weight 
1 Provincial practice : a case study 
Canadian provinces have long made agreements with foreign govern-
ments on matters touching their interests, without federal involvement. The 
subject matters of these agreements have included economic cooperation3, 
cultural relations4, family maintenance orders5, succession duties6, the 
3. See, for example, the Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation Be-
tween the Province of Alberta, Canada and the Province of Neuquén, Argentina, 14 
November 2000. See also the Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Commerce 
Between the Province of Ontario and the State of Michigan, 19 April 1988. 
4. See, for example, the Memorandum of Agreement between the Maritime Provinces and 
the State of Louisiana, 1994, the text of which is reproduced at [on line] [http://  
www.gov.nb.ca/0056/sommetyagr-le.htm], and the Entente entre la province du 
Nouveau-Brunswick et La Commission communautaire française de Belgique, the text 
of which is reproduced at [on line] [http ://www.gov.nb.ca/0056/sommet/agr-6e.htm]. 
(Both web sites visited 27 April 2001.) 
5. See A.E. GOTLIEB, «Canadian Practice in International Law, 1965», (1965) 4 C.Y.I.L. 
pp. 260-262. 
6. See « The reciprocal arrangements between Quebec, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and 
Trinidad and Tobago (1932-1934) » reported in Canadian Estate and Gift Tax Reports, 
vol. I, sections 7810, 7825, 7835. 
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environment7, and more8. Tracking down these agreements is not easy ; 
what Edward McWhinney said to this effect in 1969 remains true to this 
day: 
The examples [of interprovincial agreements] are, of course, legion ; one of the 
problems in obtaining detailed records of such trans-national agreements entered 
into by the Canadian provinces is that they have very often been highly informal 
in their modes of creation, and very often concluded, not by the Prime Minister of 
the province or his cabinet, but by intermediate-rank civil servants who have acted 
on a purely functional, utilitarian basis related to the province's needs, and dealt 
directly with their civil service counterparts in other countries without apparently 
being aware that, in doing what comes naturally, they may have created conceptu-
alistic problems for latter-day commentators9. 
In spite of this evidentiary problem, it is clear that some provinces are 
more active internationally than others. Historically, Quebec10 and Alberta 
have been in the forefront. But all Canadian provinces have concluded 
agreements with foreign governments at one time or another. Most of these 
agreements are framed in language that makes their non-binding nature 
plain. Some, however, are not so clear. It is helpful to situate the legal 
7. A notable example of multilateral, sub-federal environmental cooperation is the Great 
Lakes Charter between Ontario, Quebec, and eight American states. The Charter, con-
cluded 11 February 1985, includes a statement of « Findings », five « Principles for the 
Management of Great Lakes Water Resources », lengthy provisions on « implementa-
tion », a provision entitled « Reservation of Rights », and a definitions section. See also 
the Declaration of Partnership and Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation 
Between the Province of Ontario and the State of New York, 20 September 1991 (the 
lengthiest provisions of which concern the environment), and the Ontario-Michigan Joint 
Notification Plan of Unanticipated or Accidental Discharges of Pollutants into Shared 
Waters of the Great Lakes and Interconnecting Channels, 19 April 1988. 
8. See, for instance, Morin's discussion of the 1955 Nova Scotia-Netherlands land settle-
ment agreement, whereby Dutch immigrants could receive loans for farms in the prov-
ince: J.-Y. MORIN, «La conclusion d'accords internationaux par les provinces 
canadiennes à la lumière du droit comparé», (1965) 3 C.Y.I.L. 127, p. 178. 
9. E. MCWHINNEY, « Canadian Federalism and the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power. The 
Impact of Quebec's «Quiet Revolution»», (1969) 7 C.Y.I.L. 3 at 14nl8. 
10. Emanuelli states that Quebec has concluded over a hundred international agreements 
with a variety of states, « sans que le gouvernement federal puisse s'y opposer de façon 
efficace» : C. EMANUELLI, Droit international public: contribution à l'étude du droit 
international selon une perspective canadienne, Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1998, p. 
73. The web site of the Quebec international relations ministry puts the number even 
higher : « Le Québec privilégie le partenariat comme mode de promotion de ses intérêts. 
C'est ainsi que, depuis 1964, il a conclu plus de 400 ententes avec des organismes 
internationaux et différents pays étrangers dans des domaines aussi divers que 
l'agriculture, l'éducation, l'énergie, le transport, les télécommunications, la R-D et 
l'environnement » : [on line] [http ://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/le quebec_un_profil/affaires/ 
rel inst fr.html] (visited 27 April 2001). 
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problems considered here in actual provincial practice. To that end, I pro-
pose to consider a recent agreement concluded by the government of 
Alberta. 
I concede from the outset that Alberta is not representative of provin-
cial international activity. To the contrary, Alberta stands out as a prov-
ince with a very strong international presence, particularly in the field of 
international agreements". Alberta added an international division to its 
Department of Intergovernmental Affairs in 197812. Its motive was largely 
economic self-interest, for the resource-driven Alberta economy is particu-
larly sensitive to international market fluctuations in such sectors as oil 
and natural gas. But Alberta was also motivated by what might be called 
(perhaps too simplistically) Western alienation. As an Albertan government 
official explained in 1985, «We have... recognized that the federal govern-
ment is unable to represent all of Alberta's interests on the international 
scene or, for that matter, all the interests of all the other provinces. They 
do not have the resources to acquire the expertise and the knowledge that 
one gets by being here and seeing what is happening in the provinces...13 » 
This sentiment remains, and continues to be invoked by the Alberta gov-
ernment to explain its international presence. A recent publication by the 
Alberta Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations de-
clares « [t]he direct approach works » and goes on to explain that : 
[t]he federal government has an understandable inclination to focus on Central 
Canada, which has more than 60 per cent of Canada's population and physical 
proximity to Ottawa. Alberta's foreign offices and missions by the Alberta pre-
mier and ministers can tell the Alberta Advantage story better than the federal 
government. (In most cases, we carry out these activities in close partnership with 
Ottawa.)14. 
Alberta's active role in international affairs is not typical of all Cana-
dian provinces. It is precisely that fact which makes it a good study for our 
11. This was not always so. Writing in 1965, Morin considered that while British Columbia 
and Ontario may have shared Quebec's desire for a greater international presence, 
Alberta was uninterested in and perhaps opposed to provincial competence in interna-
tional affairs. MORIN, op. cit., note 8, p. 180. 
12. A.-M. JACOMY-MILLETTE, «Les activités internationales des provinces canadiennes» 
in P. PAINCHAUD (ed.), From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau : Forty Years of Cana-
dian Diplomacy 1945-1985, Quebec, Les Presses de llUniversité Lavall ,989, p. 86. 
13. James Dinning, speech at the University of Alberta reprinted in T. KEATING and D. 
MUNTON (eds.), The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Policy : Proceedings of a Confer-
ence, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, 28-30 March 1985, Toronto, Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1985, p. 12. 
14. Government of Alberta, A Framework for Alberta's International Strategies (February 
2000), p. 3. 
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purposes. For Alberta's activities, while not in overt denial of the federal 
government's claim to an undivided treaty power (as in the case of Quebec), 
may implicitly question that claim in some instances. 
While Alberta's foreign policy is looking increasingly far afield,15 the 
province's American neighbours continue to be of paramount impor-
tance16. In particular, Alberta has sought closer ties with the state of Mon-
tana, which shares Alberta's entire southern border. Governmental 
agreements between Alberta and Montana date back to the late 1960s and 
address such matters as civil planning, agricultural trade, border coopera-
tion, vehicle weights and inspection stations, and cross-border schooling17. 
In 1985, the two governments established the Montana-Alberta Bilateral 
Advisory Council (MABAC) as a forum for resolving irritants in cross-
border relations. In March 2000, Alberta and Montana formalized MABAC 
in a Memorandum of Understanding which included a commitment on the 
part of both parties to use MABAC to « promote, as a first step, informal 
consultations » on cross-border irritants, in the hope of averting resort to 
costlier and more acrimonious mechanisms such as the NAFTA, the WTO, 
or the courts18. The MABAC consists of several delegates from both par-
ties. The Alberta delegation includes interested ministers, government and 
opposition MLAs from southern Alberta, senior government officials and 
private sector representatives. The Montana delegation consists of the 
Lieutenant Governor, two State Senators, two State Representatives and 
four government officials19. The agreement also provides that the MABAC 
may appoint informal dispute advisory committees to address matters that 
15. On 14 November 2000, Alberta and the Argentinian province of Neuquén concluded a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation committing each government 
to « facilitating closer commercial ties between the private sector of each jurisdiction » 
with particular attention to oil and gas, natural resources development, agricultural ser-
vices, environmental technologies, education and public sector management. The two 
provinces also committed to »'endeavour to exchange information in the identified sec-
tors ». 
16. On 25 June 1999, Alberta and the Mexican state of Jalisco concluded a Protocol of Un-
derstanding and Friendship for a Sister Relationship. This superceded and broadened a 
1998 Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation between the parties. 
17. GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA, Montana-Alberta Bilateral Advisory Council (MABAC) 
(2000 ?), p. 3. Downloaded from the following web site on 27 April 2001 : [on line] [http :/ 
/www.iir.gov.ab.ca/iir/inter_rel/media/mabac.pdf]. 
18. Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation Between the Government of the State 
of Montana, United States of America and the Government of the Province of Alberta, 
Canada, Respecting the Montana/Alberta Bilateral Advisory Council (MABAC), signed 
8 March 2000 (hereafter MABAC Agreement). 
19. GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA, op. cit., note 17, p. 4. 
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cannot be resolved during M AB A C s annual meetings or in the course of 
interim discussions by MABAC delegates. 
The tenor of the MABAC agreement is informal and voluntary. The 
use of the designation « Memorandum of Understanding » indicates this in 
part, for a practice exists of entitling non-binding agreements this way20. 
The language of the agreement is frequently declaratory rather than man-
datory. Furthermore, the agreement's dispute resolution provisions explic-
itly provide as follows : 
Nothing in the above would preclude either Party from seeking action through 
other dispute resolution mechanisms (under multilateral or bilateral trade agree-
ments such as the World Trade Organization, North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, International Joint Commission, States/Provinces Agricultural Accord, 
international or domestic courts or tribunals, etc.)21. 
In spite of this proviso, and the document's consensual rather than 
mandatory language, the agreement imposes on the signatories a significant 
obligation. As the Alberta minister for international and intergovernmental 
relations explained in a letter to Messrs Axworthy and Pettigrew (the fed-
eral ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, respectively), 
« [t]he MOU commits Alberta and Montana to use and promote MABAC 
as a forum to avoid, and if necessary, resolve cross-border disputes involv-
ing the two jurisdictions22. » 
The minister's letter to the federal government is interesting not only 
for what it says about the MABAC agreement's effects between the par-
ties, but also for what it reveals about federal involvement in the negotia-
tion of the agreement. The letter is dated 20 April 2000, well over a month 
after the Alberta premier and Montana governor signed the MABAC agree-
ment and the Government of Alberta published a press release on it23. By 
all accounts, federal officials may have read about the agreement in the 
newspapers before learning of it from the Alberta government. Provincial 
independence from the federal government in the conclusion of interna-
20. This practice has only indirect support in international law. The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969, infra note 26, provides in art. 2(1 )(a) that a treaty is a treaty 
« whatever its particular designation ». But the same article also provides that a treaty is 
« governed by international law », and use of the designation « Memorandum of Under-
standing » may, in appropriate cases, signal a lack of intent to be bound by the agreement 
at international law. 
21. MABAC Agreement, supra note 18. 
22. Hon. SHIRLEY MCCLELLAN, Letter to the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy and the Hon. Pierre 
Pettigrew (20 April 2000). 
23. GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA, «Agreement creates closer ties with Montana» (8 March 
2000). 
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tional agreements in areas of provincial jurisdiction may be the most im-
portant insight offered in this brief overview of provincial practice. We 
must now consider how far that independence may go as a matter of con-
stitutional law. 
2 Treaty-making at international law 
As we will see, there are two sides to the treaty-making question : the 
federal position, held by Ottawa and supported or acquiesced to by most 
provinces, and the provincial position, advanced principally if not entirely 
by Quebec. Before considering these arguments, it is helpful to examine 
what the parties are fighting over, namely the power to conclude treaties. 
Treaties are creatures of public international law. They are agreements that 
establish rights and obligations of a legally binding nature. This aspect of 
treaties is emphasized in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice 194524 (which is viewed as declaratory of the sources of 
international law recognized by State practice). Paragraph (a) provides that 
the Court shall apply « international conventions, whether general or par-
ticular, establishing rules expressly recognizedby the contesting states25 ». 
Thus the power to conclude a treaty is the power to establish internation-
ally enforceable legal rules. 
Who may be a party to a treaty is, in the case of federations, a difficult 
question. Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 196926 
provides that « [e]very State possesses capacity to conclude treaties. » The 
term « State» is not defined, but need not necessarily exclude states with 
less than full international personality. Oppenheim considers there to be 
« no justification for the view that [member states of federations] are nec-
essarily deprived of any status whatsoever within the international com-
munity : while they are not full subjects of international law, they may be 
international persons for some purposes27. » Shaw is of the same view, 
adding that where member states of a federation have been granted some 
« restricted international competence », they may be regarded as having « a 
degree of international personality28 ». But what « degree » of international 
personality is needed for the purpose of becoming party to a treaty ? In 
24. [1945] Can. T.S. no. 7. 
25. SIR R. JENNINGS and SIR A. WATTS (eds.), Oppenheim 's International Law, 9th ed., vol. 
1, Harlow, England, Longman, 1992, section 11 (hereafter Oppenheim vol. 1). 
26. [1980] Can. T.S. no. 37. 
27. Oppenheim vol. 1, op. cit., note 25, section 75. 
28. M. N. SHAW, International Law, 4th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 
p. 156. 
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particular, does it suffice that the sub-federal unit enjoys internal compe-
tence within the federation to carry out the treaty's obligations? The an-
swer appears to be no : what is also needed is some provision in the 
federation's constitutional law establishing the capacity of the sub-federal 
unit to conclude treaties. That this is so is suggested by art. 5 (2) of the 
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 
which provided that « [sjtates members of a federal union may possess a 
capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal 
constitution and within the limits there laid down29. » This provision was 
dropped from the Vienna Convention, but seems nevertheless to represent 
the current position. 
If the Quebec argument (which we consider below) is correct, the un-
written element of the Canadian constitution provides provinces with the 
necessary capacity to conclude treaties on subject matters falling within 
their jurisdiction. But there is a further complication : while it is one thing 
for a federation's constitution to grant sub-federal units treaty-making ca-
pacity, it is another for that capacity to be recognized by other states30. The 
problem of recognition is easily overcome where the federal and sub-fed-
eral authorities agree on the matter, and make their agreement known to 
would-be parties to sub-federal treaties. But if the federal level disputes 
the sub-federal level's claim, as is the case in Canada, third states may hesi-
tate to recognize the sub-federal unit's competence31. The recognition prob-
lem may operate as a sort of de facto federal veto over provincial claims to 
treaty-making capacity. 
A final point about treaties at international law is the requirement of 
intent to create legal relations. This requirement is not found explicitly in 
the Vienna Convention ; the International Law Commission considered it 
29. Quoted in SHAW, id., p. 157. 
30. GOTLIEB, loc. cit., note 43, p. 32. 
31. I do not say that this will always be the case. In the past, there has been some suggestion 
that France recognized Quebec's claim to treaty-making competence. See McWhinney's 
discussion of France-Quebec-Canada relations in the 1960s, supra note 9, at 10-7, and I. 
BERNIER, International Legal Aspects of Federalism, London, Longman, 1973, p. 60. In 
the past few years, however, France has been more sensitive to the federal government's 
concerns. In 1996, Canada and France concluded a Mutual Legal Assistance agreement 
(cited but not reproduced in [1996] Can. T.S., lOJune 1996), art. 26 of which purported to 
authorize the provinces and territories of Canada to conclude agreements with France 
on all matters within the treaty. This « umbrella agreement » allowed Ottawa to assert a 
supervisory role over Quebec's purported treaty-making with France. (For an account 
of the development of « umbrella agreements » in the 1950s and '60s, see M. RAND, « In-
ternational Agreements Between Canadian Provinces and Foreign States», (1967) 25 
U.T. Fac. L.R. 75. See also Bemier, op. cit., pp. 58-60.) 
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to be embraced within the phrase 'governed by international law' in art. 2 
(1) (a)'s definition of 'treaty'32. Thus, for an instrument to be a treaty, i.e., 
an agreement governed by international law, it must have been intended to 
create legal relations between the parties. Lacking such intention, the in-
strument is a non-binding agreement that, while possibly not entirely with-
out legal effect33, does not create international legal obligations. The 
relevance of intent for our purposes is that a foreign state that enters into 
an agreement with a Canadian province might do so with the understand-
ing that the province is not competent to conclude treaties. In such a case 
the necessary intent to create legal relations may be lacking, and the sup-
posed treaty rendered unenforceable whatever the province's competence 
to conclude treaties may be. 
3 The federal case for an undivided treaty power 
The Constitution Act 1867 (the British North America Act) betrays its 
origins in the English traditions of unwritten constitutionalism. It does not 
It is by no means clear that such an umbrella agreement was needed, given that most if 
not all of the sorts of agreements Quebec and France might make under it could have 
been accomplished through non-binding intergovernmental agreements such as those 
concluded by Canadian provinces on a regular basis. But Canada's insistence upon a 
treaty was motivated, it appears, by the federal government's post-referendum strategy 
of combating Quebec claims to autonomy or international stature. Thus, in late 1997, 
Ottawa raised objections to a Quebec-France entente on support payments on the 
grounds that (1) the entente referred to France and Quebec as « contracting parties », a 
phrase which the federal government contended was reserved to sovereign states ; and 
(2) the entente made no mention of the Canada-France « umbrella agreement ». In a 1-
etter to the Quebec international affairs minister M Sylvain Simard, the federal foreign 
affairs minister Mr Lloyd Axworthy reportedly accused Quebec of trying to arrogate to 
itself a status reserved for sovereign states : « Accord France-Québec : Axworthy en 
remet» La Presse 11 November 1997 B4 See also «Pensions alimentaires: Simard 
estime qu'Ottawa prive les Canadiens» Le Soleil 22 October 1997 AlO and «Percep-
tion des Densions alimentaires en France : Entente irrroossible » Le Soleil 7 November 
1997 A10 
This rather embarrassing episode brings to mind McWhinney's comments on a similar 
Ottawa-Quebec controversy over Gabon in 1968 : « Looking back, it may be suggested 
that unedifying public quarrels.. .have been rather damaging to all of the parties involved, 
for they reveal a preoccupation with old-fashioned, abstract and theoretical, questions 
of where sovereignty lies and whether it is divisible in any sense—in short, an atavistic 
preoccupation with the « symbols » of government at the expense of the substance... » : 
MCWHINNEY, op. cit., note 9, pp. 13-14. 
32. « Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly » (UN Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1) dans 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol. 2, New York, United Nations, 
1967, pp. 189. (UNDOC. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add. 1) 
33. SIR R. JENNINGS and SIR A. WATTS (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., vol. 
2, Harlow, England, Longman, 1992, p. 1210. 
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purport to exhaust or encapsulate Canadian constitutional arrangements. 
Rather, it overlays a federal structure upon a largely uncodified parliamen-
tary foundation34. That foundation is referred to in the Preamble, which 
provides that Canada shall have 'a Constitution similar in Principle to that 
of the United Kingdom'. Included in the unwritten foundation of the Cana-
dian constitution are royal prerogatives, meaning powers vested in the ex-
ecutive and exercisable by it without the participation of the legislature. 
Dicey aptly described the royal prerogative as « nothing else than the resi-
due of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is le-
gally left in the hands of the Crown35 ». Today, most prerogative acts are 
done on advice, meaning that they are discharged not by the governor gen-
eral or lieutenant governor personally but by their ministers. As a matter of 
day-to-day politics, the most significant prerogative still vested in the 
Crown may be foreign affairs. This prerogative includes the powers to 
make war and peace, send and receive ambassadors, and conclude (but not 
implement) treaties. 
When Canada was formed, the foreign affairs prerogative, and the 
treaty power more particularly, remained a prerogative exercised in prac-
tice by the British foreign affairs secretary and the Foreign Office. The only 
mention of international treaties in the Constitution Act 1867 was s. 132, 
by which the federal Parliament and government were granted competence 
to perform « the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part 
of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties 
between the Empire and such Foreign Countries36. » When Canada gained 
full independence from the United Kingdom in 1931, Empire treaties be-
came a thing of the past and s. 132 fell away as a spent, but not repealed, 
provision. No constitutional amendment was made to take its place, or to 
accommodate more generally Canada's new powers over foreign policy. 
The seeds of controversy were sown by this failure to clarify to which or-
der of government the foreign affairs prerogative passed. 
34. While many parliamentary practices are entrenched in the Constitution Act 1867 (for 
instance, quorum, parliamentary privilege, and the requirement of royal consent to 
money bills), many others are not. For instance, the most basic rule of Anglo-Canadian 
constitutional arrangements, namely that whatever the Governor General assents to 
upon the advice of the Senate and Commons is law, finds no explicit statement in the 
Act, though it is implied in the Royal Assent provisions (ss. 55 to 57) and in the defini-
tions of Parliament and the Legislatures (ss. 17, 69 and 71). 
35. A.V. DICEY, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., London, 
Macmillan, 1960, p. 424. 
36. Constitution Act 1867, s. 132. 
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The position of the federal government has always been that the power 
to conclude treaties with foreign states is a prerogative of the federal Crown 
exclusively, rather than a prerogative shared by all Canadian executive 
governments37. There are four possible arguments. The first relies on the 
Letters Patent by which the king delegated his powers in respect of Canada 
to the governor general. The second rests on the fact of Canada's state-
hood at international law. The third focuses upon the legislative division of 
powers, particularly the confinement of provincial legislatures to matters 
of a local nature. The fourth argument relies on actual constitutional usage. 
Hogg contends that the exclusive federal power to make treaties is 
based upon the Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General 
of Canada 194738, the principal instrument by which the sovereign's pow-
ers in respect of Canada are delegated to the governor general39. This was 
the contention of the prime minister of the day, Mr. St Laurent, who told 
the House of Commons that « when the letters patent come into force, it 
will be legally possible for the Governor General, on the advice of the 
Canadian ministers, to exercise any of these powers and authorities^] ... 
royal full powers for the signing of treaties, ratification of treaties, and the 
issuance of letters of credence for ambassadors40. » Yet the Letters Patent 
argument is open to challenge. Clause II of those Letters reads : 
And We do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor General, with the ad-
vice of Our Privy Council for Canada or of any members thereof or individually, 
as the case requires, to exercise all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to 
Us in respect of Canada, and for greater certainty but not so as to restrict the gen-
erality of the foregoing to do and execute, in the manner aforesaid, all things that 
may belong to his office and to the trust We have reposed in him according to the 
several powers and authorities granted or appointed him by virtue of the Consti-
tution Acts, 1867 to 1940 and the powers and authorities hereinafter conferred in 
these Letters Patent and in such Commission as may be issued to him under Our 
Great Seal of Canada and under such laws as are or may hereinafter be in force in 
Canada41. 
37. See for instance : the comments (1948) of the prime minister, Mr St-Laurent, infra ; P. 
MARTIN, Federalism and International Relaiion,, Ottawa, Queen's Printer for Canada, 
1968, pp. 11-16; M. MACGUIGAN, « L e fédéralisme et les relations internationals du 
Canada», (1981 ) 12 Politique internaiionale, 189,pp. 195-196 ; letter of l February 1985 
to the Council of Europe from the Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, 
réimprimés dans (1986) 24 C.Y.I.L. 397. 
38. See R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 31. 
39. P. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, édition sur feuilles mobiles, Scarborough, 
Carswell, 1997, section 11.2. 
40. DÉBATS DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES DU CANADA, 1948, p. 1126 (Mr St Laurent). 
41. Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada, 1947, 
réimprimées dans R.S.C. 1985, App. I, No. 31. (The original text referred to the British 
North America Acts, 1867 to 1946.) 
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The federal argument is that the treaty power, formerly exercised by 
the Crown on the advice of British ministers, was passed to the federal 
government by this clause. But the clause applies only to those powers and 
authorities lawfully belonging to the sovereign «in respect of Canada». 
This phrase must be read, it seems, to exclude those powers and authori-
ties lawfully belonging to the sovereign in respect of the provinces, for it is 
nowhere contended that the Letters Patent 1947 affect the office of lieuten-
ant governor. Thus, if the passage of the treaty power from the UK to 
Canada in 1931 tracked legislative jurisdiction under the Constitution Act 
1867 (which, as we will see, is the provincial argument), nothing in the Let-
ters Patent changed that. To read « in respect of Canada » as meaning « in 
respect of the federal and provincial governments » only begs the question. 
A further difficulty in relying on the Letters Patent is that the theory fails 
to explain where the treaty-making power lay between 1931 and 1947. 
The second argument for an exclusively federal treaty power draws 
this conclusion from the fact of Canada's status as a sovereign state at in-
ternational law. The argument here is that Canada, as a single state for the 
purpose of international law, must have only one international personality 
and therefore only one government competent to act on the international 
scene42. This argument often finds support in comparative analyses of the 
constitutional structures of other federal states, most of which assign 
treaty-making exclusively to the federal level43. The international law of 
42. A typical exposition of this approach is J.-Y. GRENON, « De la conclusion des traités et 
de leur mis en œuvre au Canada», (1962) 40 Can. B.R. 151. This approach is supported 
by an American case, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (1936) 299 U.S. 304, 
in which Sutherland J declared : 
... the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did 
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and 
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other 
sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the constitution, would have vested 
in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality....Otherwise, the 
United States is not completely sovereign. 
Similarly, the external affairs minister, Paul Martin Sr, argued that « if individual con-
stituent members of a federal state had the right to conclude treaties independently of 
the central power, it would no longer be a federation but an association of sovereign 
powers » (quoted in MORRIS, loc. cit., note 43). 
43. For such a comparative approach, see A.E. GOTLIEB, Canadian Treaty-Making, Toronto, 
Butterworths, 1968, pp. 25-27, and G. L. MORRIS, «The Treaty-Making Power : a Cana-
dian Dilemma», (1967) 45 Can. B.R. 478, pp. 492-497. For a comparison of the treaty-
powers of Quebec and the Belgian communities, see A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, «Le Québec 
et les relations internationales», dans P. PATENAUDE (ed.), Québec-Communauté 
Française de Belgique: autonomie et spécificité dans le cadre d'un système fédéral, 
Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1992, p. 209. 
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statehood and legal personality has been considered above. There are two 
points. First, as we saw, the international position is not as straightforward 
as this argument makes out. International law appears to permit the con-
stituent units of a federal state to enjoy some measure of international per-
sonality, including competence to conclude treaties. Second, the 
comparative approach is not, on its own, conclusive. To say that other fed-
erations do not divide the treaty power between the federal and sub-fed-
eral levels suggests certain policy arguments against such a division here in 
Canada, but sheds no light on the actual position of Canadian law. 
The third argument in support of a federal treaty-making power relies 
on the constitution's division of legislative powers. The argument is as fol-
lows. Matters of provincial legislative jurisdiction can generally be charac-
terized as «merely local or private44». By contrast, Parliament's 
jurisdiction extends to matters of national interest or, in the language of s. 
91, to matters concerning «the Peace, Order, and good Government of 
Canada45 ». Executive powers and responsibilities track the legislative di-
vision of powers : Maritime Bank?6. The obligations of the Canadian state 
at international law are properly associated with the federal residual power 
and not with provincial heads of jurisdiction because treaty obligations are 
not « merely local or private » but national, and indeed international. There 
are at least two problems with this argument. First, to found the federal 
treaty power in Parliament's residual peace, order and good government 
power runs contrary to the decision of the Privy Council in Labour Con-
vention^1 that international treaties are not a discrete head of jurisdiction 
under the 1867 Act, but fall instead to be implemented by whichever order 
has jurisdiction over the treaty's subject-matter. Historically, Labour Con-
ventions has been an unpopular decision among English-Canadian com-
mentators48, and has even been questioned by two Chief Justices of 
Canada49. Nevertheless, it was cited with approval by the Supreme Court 
of Canada as recently as 199450, and remains the law51. A second problem 
44. Constitution Act 1867, s. 92 (16). 
45. Constitution Act 1S67, preamble of s. 911 
46. [1892] A.C. 437 (P.C.). 
47. AC Canada v. AG Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.), (hereafter Labour Conventions). 
48. For a full discussion, see G. V. ERT, «Using treaties in Canadian courts», (2000) 38 
C.Y.I.L. (à paraître). 
49. Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 618, 621 per Kerwin CJ ; MacDonald v. Vapor 
Canada, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 168-169 per Laskin CJ. See also Schneider v. The Queen, 
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, 134-135 per Dickson CJ. 
50. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 611. 
51. VAN ERT, op. cit., note 48. 
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with this argument is its characterization of provincial power as « merely 
local or private » and thus inconsistent with treaty-making. Notice first that 
this is question begging : treaties are only necessarily national in scope if 
the provinces lack the power to bind themselves, and themselves alone, by 
concluding treaties. That objection aside, it is mistaken to assume that the 
content of treaty obligations cannot be local or private. States today con-
clude treaties that have as much to do with their own internal affairs as 
they do with international affairs. The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 198952, the North American Free Trade Agreement 199253, the Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization 199454, and a great num-
ber of human rights instruments are treaties which put into question 
classical notions of state sovereignty by purporting to control the signa-
tory states' regulation of their own nationals and economies. 
The fourth argument for an undivided federal treaty power is founded 
on a theory of the development of the unwritten constitution. According to 
this approach, the treaty-making power has settled exclusively on the fed-
eral government by constitutional practice. As Duff CJ explained in Re 
Weekly Rest (the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Labour Conven-
tions), 
As a rule, the crystallization of constitutional usage into a rule of constitutional 
law to which the Courts will give effect is a slow process extending over a long 
period of time ; but the Great War accelerated the pace of development in the re-
gion with which we are concerned, and it would seem that the usages to which I 
have referred, the practice, that is to say, under which Great Britain and the Do-
minions enter into agreements with foreign countries in the form of agreements 
between governments and of a still more informal character, must be recognized 
by the Courts as having the force of law55. 
The argument here is that the unwritten constitution develops by po-
litical and judicial recognition of the legitimacy of adopted practices. In the 
case of the treaty power, these practices should include not only the as-
sumption of the power by federal officials and the general (though not 
unanimous) consent of their provincial counterparts, but also the practice 
of other states in recognizing the federal government, rather than the prov-
inces, as the authority competent to bind Canada at international law. I will 
52. [1992] Can. T.S. no. 3. On the provincial nature of the Convention's provisions, see 
Strayer JA in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 
127, 141 (F.C.A.). 
53. [1994] Can. T.S. no. 2. 
54. Ratified by Canada 31 December 1994. 
55. Re the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, the Minimum Wages Act, and the 
Limitation of Hours of Work Act, [1936] S.C.R. 461, 477 per Duff CJ. Hereafter Re 
Weekly Rest. 
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return to this argument below, but for now we may note two problems with 
it. The first is the concept of crystallization itself, of which the Supreme 
Court of Canada was critical in Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution56. 
The second difficulty with this argument is Quebec's persistent objection, 
which undermines the legitimacy of the practice and thus its suitability to 
be recognized as unwritten constitutional law. It is to the Quebec position 
that I now turn. 
4 The divided Crown : the provincial argument 
The argument for the existence of a provincial jus tractatum was first 
made by Ontario, not Quebec. The Attorney General for Ontario made the 
argument before the Supreme Court of Canada, and later the Privy Coun-
cil, in Labour Conventions. Before the Board, counsel for the Attorney 
General submitted that 
[t]here are no grounds whatever for saying that the parties to advise His Majesty 
in matters relating to the jurisdiction of the Provinces have in some way come to 
be the Dominion Ministers. The Province has the right to advise the Crown in 
matters where its legislative powers apply. Ontario has a right to enter into an 
agreement with another part of the British Empire or with a foreign State57. 
This argument had enjoyed limited success before the Supreme Court 
of Canada. It won some support from Rinfret J in dissent58, but was not 
supported by Duff CJ (writing for himself and Davis and Kerwin JJ)59 nor 
by Crocket J.60 The remaining judge, Cannon J, dissented without specifi-
cally considering the argument. Before the Privy Council, the case was 
decided on other grounds. Their Lordships declined to rule on provincial 
competence to conclude treaties. 
56. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (the Patriation Reference), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753. 
57. [1937] A.C. 326, 333 (P.C.). 
58. Re Weekly Rest, précité note 55, 510-512. At 512, Rinfret J wrote, « In Canada, the prac-
tice has grown gradually to enter into international conventions through the medium of 
the Governor in Council. It does appear that it would be directly against the intendment 
of the British North America Act that the King or the Governor General should enter 
into an international agreement dealing with matters exclusively assigned to the jurisdic-
tion of the provinces solely upon the advice of the federal Ministers who, either by them-
selves or even through the instrumentality of the Dominion Parliament are prohibited by 
the Constitution from assuming jurisdiction over these matters. » 
59. Id., 496. Duff CJ held that « in no respect does the Lieutenant-Governor of a province 
represent the Crown in respect of relations with foreign Governments. » This statement 
is clearly obiter, and on appeal was explicitly left undecided by the Privy Council. Yet 
proponents of the undivided treaty power, including the Government of Canada, have 
made disingenuous use of this dictum as though it were ratio decidendi. See E. 
MCWHINNEY, op. cit., note 9, pp. 6-7. 
60. Re Weekly Rest, précité note 55, 535. 
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Without a ruling the argument persisted, though its champion changed. 
Ontario has long abandoned any claim to treaty-making power. As an 
Ontario government official explained in 1985, «Ontario has no interest 
whatsoever in a foreign policy which could be described as provincial. 
There is only one foreign policy and that is that of the federal govern-
ment61. » Most other Canadian provinces agree with this position, though 
not all would put it so strongly. Today, the sole proponent of the argument 
that provincial governments are competent to conclude treaties binding 
their provinces at international law is Quebec62. Indeed, the argument has 
come to be known as the Gérin-Lajoie thesis, after the Quebec minister of 
education who revived the argument and forcefully asserted Quebec's 
power to negotiate and conclude, within its legislative jurisdiction, agree-
ments with foreign states. The departure of M Gérin-Lajoie from Quebec's 
political scene has not dampened enthusiasm for his argument, particularly 
among sovereigntists. In 1999, the Bloc Québécois MP, Daniel Turp, intro-
duced private member's legislation that purported to recognize « the royal 
prerogative of Her Majesty in right of a province with respect to the nego-
tiation and conclusion of treaties63 ». That bill died on the order paper, but 
a recent enactment of the Assemblée nationale contained an elaboration of 
the same claim. Section 7 of Quebec's so-called Bill 99 reads as follows : 
The Québec State is free to consent to be bound by any treaty, convention or in-
ternational agreement in matters under its constitutional jurisdiction. 
No treaty, convention or agreement in the areas under its jurisdiction may be bind-
ing on the Québec State unless the consent of the Québec State to be bound has 
been formally expressed by the National Assembly or the Government, subject to 
the applicable legislative provisions. 
The Québec State may, in the areas under its jurisdiction, establish and maintain 
relations with foreign States and international organizations and ensure its repre-
sentation outside Québec64. 
61. John Carson, speech at the University of Alberta reprinted in T. KEATING and D. 
MUNTON, The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Policy: Proceedings of a Conference, 
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, 28-30 March 1985, Toronto, Canadian Insti-
tute of International Affairs, 1985, p. 6. 
62. See A. JACOMY-MILLETTE, Treaty Law in Canada, Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 
1975, pp. 78-94. 
63. Bill C-214, An Act to provide for the participation of the House of Commons when trea-
ties are concluded, 2d Sess., 36th Parliament, 1999, cl. 6. 
64. An Act respecting the exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the 
Québec People and the Québec State, S.Q. 2000, c. 46, s. 7. This is not the only Quebec 
law declaring the province's competence to conclude international agreements. Chapter 
3 of the Loi sur le ministère des Relations internationales, R.S.Q., c. M-25.1 provides, in 
s. 19, that the minister of international relations shall oversee the negotiation and imple-
mentation of international agreements, and proceeds, in ss. 20 to 26, to elaborate upon 
and regulate those powers. 
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It is interesting to note that s. 7 asserts no more than Quebec's right to 
conclude treaties within its constitutional jurisdiction ; no claim is made to 
conclude treaties touching federal matters. 
The legal argument that provinces enjoy a power to make treaties is 
founded on the decision of the Privy Council in Liquidators of Maritime 
Bank v. Receiver General of New Brunswick. The case had nothing to do 
with treaties. Rather, the question there was whether the government of 
New Brunswick was entitled to preference over other unsecured creditors 
of an insolvent bank. At common law, the Crown enjoyed preferred credi-
tor status as a matter of prerogative. The liquidators argued that the gov-
ernment of New Brunswick was not entitled to preference because the 
prerogatives of the Crown could not be invoked by provincial governments. 
The governor general was the only representative of the Crown in Canada, 
and the lieutenant governors were mere federal appointees. The Privy 
Council forcefully rejected this argument, declaring that « a Lieutenant-
Governor, when appointed, is as much the representative of Her Majesty 
for all purposes of provincial government as the Governor-General himself 
is for all purposes of Dominion government66 ». Thus the prerogative pow-
ers of the Crown do not vest wholly in the governor general, but are dis-
tributed between the federal and provincial executives. 
When Maritime Bank was decided, the Crown's prerogative to con-
clude treaties on behalf of Canada was exercised by the Queen on the ad-
vice of her British ministers. Clearly, their Lordships did not contemplate 
that their decision would be used to found the argument for a provincial 
treaty-making power. Nevertheless, that power follows from the logic of 
the judgment. If treaty-making is an aspect of the royal prerogative, and 
the lieutenant governor of a province is 'as much the representative of Her 
Majesty for all purposes of provincial government as the Governor-Gen-
eral himself is for all purposes of Dominion government', then the treaty 
power must vest in the lieutenant governor and governor general alike — 
assuming that treaty-making is one of the « purposes of provincial govern-
ment». Those purposes, it seems, are set out principally in s. 92 of the 
Constitution Act 1867. They do not exclude the making of treaties with 
foreign states. Rather, the phrase « provincial purposes » serves only to 
restrict the subject matters of provincially-concluded treaties to those fall-
ing within provincial legislative jurisdiction. In short, this argument 
65. Maritime Bank, précité note 46. 
66. Id., 443. See also Hodge v. The Queen, [1883] 9 App. Cas. 117 (P.C.), upon which the 
Board relied, and the later Privy Council decision in Bonanza Creek Gold Mining v. The 
King, [1916] 1 A.C. 556. 
1112 Les Cahiers de Droit (2001) 42 C. de D. 1091 
proposes that there is no legal bar to the conclusion by provincial minis-
ters, in the name of the lieutenant governor, of legally binding treaties 
within provincial jurisdiction. 
We have already considered the federal arguments for an undivided 
treaty power, all of which strive (with doubtful success) to rebut the pro-
vincial claim. A further argument against the Gérin-Lajoie thesis might be 
that it artificially divides the Crown's power to conclude treaties from the 
general prerogative over foreign affairs of which it forms a part. The for-
eign affairs prerogative includes not only treaty-making but also diplomatic 
relations, the waging of war, and the conclusion of peace. These functions 
are not divisible from each other, but interconnected. Thus, the Crown may 
declare war pursuant to the terms of an alliance founded upon a treaty and 
administered in part by the diplomatic corps, and later cease hostilities with 
the enemy under the terms of a peace treaty negotiated by the Crown's 
ambassadors. The Quebec position has yet to go so far as to assert a power 
in the lieutenant governor in council to declare war, or to decline to go to 
wars declared by the federal government. How, one might object, can the 
Crown's power to conclude treaties be so neatly distinguished from its 
other seemingly federal foreign affairs powers ? 
The Quebec thesis has a strong answer to this challenge. As regards 
the prerogative power of diplomatic relations, such relations are already 
engaged in by the provinces. Several provinces have permanent offices 
abroad, only some of which operate under the aegis of Canadian delega-
tions. While the federal government has occasionally grumbled, no serious 
constitutional challenge has ever been mounted against the power of the 
provinces to establish foreign missions. Nor could such challenge be made, 
for there is nothing in the Constitution Act 1867 placing diplomacy within 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Turning now to the prerogatives of war and 
peace, Maritime Bank supplies the answer : national defence is clearly a 
matter of federal jurisdiction under s. 91 (7) of the Constitution Act 1867. 
The Quebec position claims no powers of war and peace, nor any other 
power within federal jurisdiction, as part of the provincial Crown's pre-
rogatives. In sum, the foreign affairs prerogative is indeed susceptible to 
division : the diplomatic and treaty powers are exercisable by the Crown in 
the right of Canada and the provinces, while the powers of war and peace 
are assigned to the federal Crown by s. 91 (7) and the rule in Maritime Bank. 
5 Canadian Case-Law 
No Canadian court has yet answered the question of the capacity of 
provincial governments to bind their provinces by treaty at international 
law. Yet there is some case-law of relevance. First, there is the Supreme 
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Court of Canada's consideration of Canadian legal personality at interna-
tional law in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia6 . Second, 
there are two judgments in which the capacity of the provinces to conclude 
treaties was at issue, but not decided : Attorney General for Ontario v. 
Scott6* and Bazylo v. Collins®. 
Re Offshore Mineral Rights held that Canada and not British Colum-
bia enjoyed property rights and legislative jurisdiction over the territorial 
sea and continental shelf adjacent to British Columbia. In determining the 
territorial sea question, the Court placed great emphasis on Canada's 
achievement of sovereignty at international law. «There can be no doubt 
now », wrote the Court in an unsigned judgment, 
that Canada has become a sovereign state....It is Canada which is recognized by 
international law as having rights in the territorial sea adjacent to the Province of 
British Columbia....Canada has now full constitutional capacity to acquire new 
areas of territory and new jurisdictional rights which may be available under inter-
national law....Canada is recognized in international law as having sovereignty 
over a territorial sea three nautical miles wide. It is part of the territory of 
Canada70. 
These observations do not say explicitly that Canada alone has inter-
national legal personality. Whether the provinces also have some degree of 
international personality was not considered by the Court. But the thrust 
of these comments is clear : the achievement of independence from the 
United Kingdom benefited Canada as a whole more than, or perhaps rather 
than, its constituent provinces. If the provinces have no legal personality at 
international law, their governments may not bind them through treaties, 
for they have no authority to bind Canada as a whole, and the territory for 
which they do have authority is not a subject of international law, and is 
therefore incapable of being bound. 
The Court in Re Offshore Mineral Rights also noted the role of inter-
national recognition in deciding the dispute. They observed that the rights 
in the territorial sea depend upon recognition by other sovereign states, and 
that Canada is recognized as a sovereign state internationally. The implied 
contrast here is to the unrecognized « state » of British Columbia. The 
Court went on to explain that Canada « is a sovereign state recognized by 
international law and thus able to enter into arrangements with other states 
respecting the rights in the territorial sea71 ». The significance of this decla-
67. [1967] S.C.R. 793 (hereafter Re Offshore Mineral Rights). 
68. [1956] S.C.R. 137 (hereafter Scott). 
69. [1984] C.A. 268 (hereafter Bazylo). 
70. Re Offshore Mineral Rights, précité note 67, 816. 
71. Id,, 817. 
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ration is perhaps not obvious, but if « treaties » is substituted for « arrange-
ments » »- and such arrangements do ordinarily take the form of treaties— 
the Court's meaning is plain: whatever the merits of the Gérin-Lajoie 
thesis as a matter of Canadian constitutional law, the recognition require-
ment in international law makes the federal government Canada's only ef-
fective treaty-making power. 
I have attempted to demonstrate how the judgment in Re Offshore 
Mineral Rights may be interpreted as relevant to the question of whether 
provinces enjoy capacity to conclude treaties. Yet I would suggest that, on 
balance, the Court's statements about Canada's acquisition of international 
legal personality ultimately do not address the question at issue here, 
namely, the question of how Canada's newly-acquired sovereignty is dis-
tributed between the different levels of government. 
The only Supreme Court judgment specifically to consider the capac-
ity of provinces to conclude internationally binding agreements is the 1955 
case of A-G Ontario v. Scott11. In point of fact there was no written agree-
ment before the court in this case. But some sort of agreement clearly ex-
isted between Ontario and the United Kingdom, for Ontario's Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act73 gave effect to maintenance or-
ders made by English courts, and English law accorded Ontario orders the 
same recognition. Such an order had been made against Scott in England 
and was about to be' given effect in Ontario, where he now resided, when 
he challenged the Act as ultra vires the Legislature. Scott argued, inter alia, 
that the arrangement between Ontario and the UK was effectively a treaty 
to which the province had no authority to become a party, because treaty-
making power resided exclusively in the federal government. How this ar-
gument could be used to invalidate legislation is hard to see : even if the 
Legislature were motivated by intent to implement a constitutionally im-
proper treaty, the Act would surely remain valid so long as it could be 
brought under s. 92 of the British North America Act 1867. For, as Lord 
Atkin held in Labour Conventions, « there is no such thing as treaty legis-
lation as such74 ». The judgments in Scott did not make this point, how-
ever. Rand J (for himself and three others) held that the underlying 
agreement behind the Act was not a treaty but a non-binding agreement 
between the two jurisdictions : « The enactments of the two legislatures 
[Queen's Park and Westminster] are complementary but voluntary ; the 
application of each is dependent on that of the other : each is the condition 
72. Scott, précité note 68. 
73. R.S.O. 1950, c. 334. 
74. Labour Conventions, précité note 47, 351. 
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of the other ; but that condition possesses nothing binding to its continu-
ance. The essentials of a treaty are absent...75» Similarly, Abbott J (for 
himself and two others) affirmed the view of the court below that there 
was no « valid legal reason why the Province of Ontario cannot, in relation 
to a subject-matter within its legislative jurisdiction, make a reciprocal ar-
rangement with another Province or a foreign State in relation to such sub-
ject-matter76. » Ultimately, Scott says nothing about provincial capacity to 
conclude treaties, for it describes the agreement in issue as mere non-bind-
ing. Scott is notable, however, as an instance of Supreme Court recogni-
tion of the power of provinces to enter into non-binding international 
agreements. 
To my knowledge, the only other case to have considered provincial 
treaty-making is the judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Bazylo v. 
Collins11. Like Scott, this case concerned the validity of a provincial law 
giving effect to family law orders from outside the jurisdiction. Unlike 
Scott, however, the Act in question78 explicitly implemented an 'entente' 
between the governments of France and Quebec on mutual aid in judicial 
matters. The appellant admitted that the subject-matter of the Act was 
within provincial jurisdiction, but contended that Quebec had no power to 
sign the entente. Rothman J for the court noted that the agreement between 
the two governments « appears to be clothed in the formal dress of some-
thing more than a simple administrative arrangement79». This treaty-like 
form is in keeping with Quebec's claim that it is competent to conclude 
binding treaties at international law. Rather than decide that matter, 
Rothman J preferred to « read down » the would-be treaty. He found that 
« whatever the form of the Entente, one must look beyond it to its sub-
stance80», and went on to say that « [i]n spite of its formal appearance, I 
agree with the trial judge that the Entente was simply an administrative 
arrangement between the two jurisdictions and not a binding agreement, 
much less an international treaty81 ». 
Here as in Scott, the court avoided the question of provincial compe-
tence to conclude treaties by holding that the agreements in question were 
75. Scott, précité note 68, 142. 
76. Id., 147. The remaining judge, Locke J, mentioned Scott's treaty argument only briefly : 
see id., pp. 153-154. 
77. Bazylo, précité note 69. 
78. Loi assurant I'application de l'entente sur l'entraide judiciaire entre la France et le 
Québec, L.Q. 1978, c. 20. 
79. Bazylo, précité note 69, 270. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Id., 271. 
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not treaties. It is tempting in both cases to read into their reasons the rule 
that, had the agreements been treaties, they would have been ultra vires the 
provincial government. But neither case in fact stands for that proposition, 
and indeed that proposition would not have helped resolve the cases for, as 
I have argued, an otherwise intra vires Act of the Legislature could not be 
made ultra vires that Legislature due simply to the provincial government's 
unconstitutional attempt to conclude a treaty. In my view, the court in 
Bazylo need not have entertained the appellant's treaty argument. For even 
if the agreement were intended by the parties to be a binding treaty at inter-
national law, that fact alone could not have impugned the Legislature's Act. 
The separation of powers doctrine requires that the validity of legislative 
Acts not turn on government intentions in introducing and supporting them. 
Nor may an Act be ultra vires simply because it aims to implement a treaty, 
for treaty implementation is not a distinct head of power under the Consti-
tution Act 1867 : Labour Conventions. 
The three cases considered here appear in some respects to lean to-
wards recognizing an undivided federal treaty-making power. But they do 
not decide the issue. For all the theories advocated by politicians and aca-
demics from both sides, the treaty power question remains unanswered as 
a matter of law. 
6 The unwritten constitution : crystalization and consent 
Having now considered the arguments for and against provincial com-
petence to conclude treaties, and the positions at international and Cana-
dian law, one would hope to be in a position to take a side. But to my mind, 
the debate comes out a draw. The federal arguments from the Letters 
Patent, Canadian statehood, and the division of powers fail, I suggest, to 
rebut Quebec's position, founded as it is on the strong authority of Mari-
time Bank. As a matter of pure constitutional law, the Quebec argument 
seems a winner. Yet the question of provincial treaty-making is not one of 
pure constitutional law, for it also involves constitutional practice and in-
ternational recognition. It is here that the Quebec position breaks down. 
Canadian practice in treaty-making points clearly towards an undivided 
federal treaty power, in spite of Quebec's persistent objections. Likewise, 
international political reality suggests that, with the possible exception of 
France82, no other state recognizes Canadian provinces as competent to 
conclude treaties. 
The question, then, is how to reconcile constitutional law with consti-
tutional usage and international practice. The argument for provincial cora-
82. See the discussion at supra note 31. 
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petence makes no attempt to do that. Nor do three of the four pro-federal 
arguments canvassed above. Only the « crystallization of constitutional 
usage» argument offers any means of reconciling Quebec's seemingly 
sound statement of the law, founded on Maritime Bank, with the blunt re-
ality that the federal claim is accepted by most provinces and recognized 
by state practice at international law. If there is a solution to the treaty-
power problem, it must lie somewhere here. But as I observed earlier, there 
are two serious objections to the argument that the treaty power has « crys-
tallized » in the federal Crown. 
The first objection is to the notion of crystallization itself. The con-
cept was carefully scrutinized, and rejected, by the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Patriation Reference^. That case is a leading state-
ment, not only in Canadian law but also in the UK and other Common-
wealth jurisdictions, of the distinction between constitutional laws and 
constitutional conventions. A convention is an obligatory rule of constitu-
tional practice, a sort of constitutional morality, whose enforcement lies 
not with courts of law but with the very political actors who are required to 
observe it. As the majority (on the convention question) explained in the 
Patriation Reference, « [t]he conventional rules of the Constitution present 
one striking peculiarity. In contradistinction to the laws of the Constitu-
tion, they are not enforced by the Courts84. » « The judgment gave as an 
example the convention whereby the queen, the governor general or the 
lieutenant governor grants royal assent to every bill passed by both Houses 
of Parliament or a provincial Legislature. » « [I]f this particular convention 
were violated and assent were improperly withheld, the Courts would be 
bound to enforce the law, not the convention. They would refuse to recog-
nize the validity of a vetoed bill85. » The majority hastened to add, how-
ever, that the legal unenforceability of conventions does not mean their 
breach goes without a remedy. Rather, conventions are enforced by the 
sense of propriety shared by our political actors from politicians to offi-
cials to the people themselves. Nor does the lack of legal enforcement ren-
der conventions any less « constitutional » : « it is perfectly appropriate to 
say that to violate a convention is to do something which is unconstitu-
tional although it entails no direct legal consequence86 ». 
The distinction between law and convention was essential to 
Manitoba's argument in the case. Counsel for the Manitoban Attorney-
83. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, précité note 56. By 'majority' I mean the 
majority on the legal question, not the convention question. 
84. Id., 880. 
85. Id., 881. 
86. Id., 883. 
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General contended that there existed a convention of the Canadian consti-
tution that the Houses of Parliament would not pass a resolution calling 
upon the queen to cause to be introduced in the British Parliament an 
amendment to the Constitution of Canada affecting the powers of the prov-
inces without their consent. From here, the Attorney-General went further 
and argued that this convention had crystallized into a rule of law enforce-
able by the courts. The Supreme Court wholly rejected the theory that a 
constitutional convention might become enforceable before the courts of 
law. In doing so, their Lordships examined the reasons of Duff CJ on 
«crystallization», quoted above, and held that the Chief Justice's com-
ments were directed toward «an evolution...of customary international 
law ; the attainment by the Canadian federal executive of full and indepen-
dent power to enter into international agreements87. » Having distinguished 
(not very satisfactorily) Duff CJ's judgment, their Lordships rejected the 
Attorney-General's crystallization argument with the observation that, 
« [w]hat is desirable as a political limitation does not translate into a legal 
limitation, without expression in imperative constitutional text or stat-
ute88. » 
Does this judgment force us to abandon any argument that the treaty-
power has crystallized in the federal government to the exclusion of the 
provinces ? In my view, it does not. Manitoba's submission was that a con-
stitutional convention had become constitutional law. The federal treaty-
power argument, by contrast, does not rest on a convention. Clearly the 
Patriation Reference excludes the argument which runs, « It has been a 
convention of the Canadian constitution that the power to conclude trea-
ties resides in the federal government alone, and that convention has now 
become enforceable as law. » But the « Patriation Reference » does not ex-
clude a similar crystallization argument predicated not on convention but 
on constitutional usage. That argument may be sketched as follows : 
«Upon Canada's attainment of full independence, no law of the written 
constitution assigned the treaty-making power. From the very outset, how-
ever, the practice was that the federal government exercised that power. 
Likewise, the government of Canada was recognized by other states as 
competent to bind Canada at international law. This practice never 
achieved the status of a constitutional convention, for it lacked a 
convention's obligatory character ; it was not a matter of political moral-
ity. It was simply a usage developed in the absence of a clear rule. That 
usage has now crystallized into an unwritten constitutional law enforce-
able by our courts. » This crystallization argument is fundamentally differ-
87. Id., 778. 
88. Id., 784. 
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ent from the one rejected in the Patriation Reference, for it involves no 
suggestion that constitutional conventions can become enforceable laws. 
Rather, the argument is that constitutional usages may become unwritten 
laws. 
What is the difference between a constitutional usage and a constitu-
tional convention ? The phrase « constitutional usage » is precisely that 
which Duff CJ used in Re Weekly Rest. That the Chief Justice used this 
phrase instead of the phrase « constitutional convention » suggests that he 
was well aware that conventions were unenforceable as laws89. It was his 
view, however, that « constitutional law consists very largely of established 
constitutional usages recognized by the Courts as embodying a rule of 
law90». The difference between constitutional usages and constitutional 
conventions is illustrated in a passage from Turpin : 
The working of our system of government is conditioned by a mass of usages or 
practices which must be taken into account if the system is to be properly under-
stood. Some of these usages affect the behaviour of the principal organs of the 
state or their mutual relations, while others operate at lower levels of the conduct 
of official business and may not be dignified as having a constitutional character : 
here again we approach the uncertain limits of « the constitution ». Among higher 
level usages are some that are distinguished by their obligatory character as « con-
ventions of the constitution91 ». 
A constitutional usage, then, is one which is constitutional in nature 
(meaning that it concerns the operation of government) but which lacks the 
obligatoriness that renders its breach « unconstitutional in the conventional 
sense92 ». 
If we accept the distinction between constitutional usages and consti-
tutional conventions, we must next consider the existence of unwritten 
constitutional laws. Here we withdraw somewhat from what Turpin calls 
the « uncertain limits » of the constitution. For the Supreme Court of 
Canada has unequivocally held that the constitution consists of both writ-
ten and unwritten laws. In the Patriation Reference, the majority (on the 
convention question), declared : 
A substantial part of the rules of the Canadian Constitution are [sic] written. They 
are contained not in a single document called a Constitution but in a great variety 
of statutes some of which have been enacted by the Parliament at Westminster, 
89. The majority insisted that Duff CJ was aware of this point, and that his judgment was 
consistent with it : id., 778-779. 
90. Re Weekly Rest, précité note 55, 476. 
91. C. TURPIN, British Government and the Constitution : Text, Cases and Materials, 3d ed., 
London, Butterworths, 1995, pp. 87-88. 
92. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, précité note 83, 909. 
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such as the British North Ameiica Act, 1867..., or by the Parliament of Canada, 
such as the Alberta Ac,, 1905... ; the Saskatchewan Act, 1905... ; the Senate and 
House of Commons Act.,., or by the provincial Legislatures, such as the provin-
cial electoral Acts. They are also to be found in Orders in Council... 
Another part of the Constitution of Canada consists of the rules of the common 
law. These are rules which the Courts have developed over the centuries in the 
discharge of their judicial duties". 
Similarly, in Re Provincial Court Judges Lamer CJ confirmed that 
« the Constitution embraces unwritten, as well as written rules94 ». Some 
examples of unwritten laws of the constitution include : the rule that the 
Crown is not a source of law95 ; the doctrine of implied repeal96 ; the rule 
that customary international law is incorporated by the common law of 
Canada97 ; the requirement that treaties be implementation by legislation 
to have domestic effects (a version of the prohibition on Crown legisla-
tion)98 ; and the law of parliamentary privilege99. 
93. Id., 876. 
94. Reference re Retnuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island ; 
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince 
Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3,68. See also New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova 
Scoiia (Speakrr of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 and Referenee re Seces-
sion of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
95. That rule is unwritten in the sense that it is not entrenched in the Constitution of Canada 
as described in s. 52(2) of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Yet the rule that the Crown cannot unilaterally make law finds 
written expression in case-law and in the Bill of Rights 1689, an Act of the UK Parlia-
ment which passed into Canadian law by reception. That Act continues in force in all 
Canadian jurisdictions. As Brun and Tremblay observe, «on peut toujours plaider 
l'application au Canada de certains anciens statuts anglais qui consituent l'armature de 
base du droit constitutionnel britannique, tels la Magna Caria de 1215, la Petition of 
Right de 1627, le Bill of Rights de 1689 ou Y Act of Settlement de. 1700» ; H. BRUN et G. 
T R E M B L A Y Droit constitutionnel, 2nd ed., Cowansville, Québec, Les Editions Yvon 
Biais 1990 p. 19. The rule that the executive lacks legislative power is also implied by 
the definitions of the federal and provincial legislatures in the Constitution Act 1S67. 
96. That doctrine may, it seems, be subject to the operation of « primacy clauses » and other 
so-called manner and form requirements. See HOGG, op. cit., note 39, at section 12.3(b). 
97. For a lengthy discussion of the incorporation of customary international law in Canada, 
see VAN E R T , International Law in Canada: Principles, Customs, Treaties and Rights, 
mémoire de maîtrise, Toronto, Faculté des études supérieures, Université de Toronto, 
2000, chapitre 3. 
98. Labour Conventions, précité note 57 ; Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian 
Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 ; Francis, précité note 49 ; Baker v. 
Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
99. In respect of Parliament, those privileges are acknowledged but not set out in s. 18 the 
Constitution Act 1867. No mention of the parliamentary privileges of provincial Legisla-
tures is made in the 1867 Act. 
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How, then, do unwritten constitutional laws arise ? They have no 
single source. The many laws and customs of parliamentary privilege, for 
instance, arose from parliamentary practice recognized by the courts and, 
in some cases, declared in legislation (such as the art. 9 of the Bill of Rights 
1689)100. The implementation of customary international law is a judge-
made rule of the common law. Implied repeal has its origins in the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty, the origins of which are obscure but appear 
to derive from positivist political theory, common law adjudication, and 
constitutional usage101. In short, unwritten constitutional laws have no 
single author, no standard form, and no common pedigree. The most that 
can be said about them as a general proposition is that they arise from con-
stitutional practice and are given the imprimatur of law by the judges. This 
is what I take Duff CJ to have meant when he spoke of « the crystallization 
of constitutional usage into a rule of constitutional law to which the Courts 
will give effect102 ». 
The Patriation Reference, properly understood, does not exclude the 
argument that an undivided federal treaty-making power is established in 
Canadian constitutional usage and may have crystallized into an unwritten 
constitutional law cognizable by the courts. There remains, however, the 
second objection to the crystallization argument, namely that since 1965 if 
not earlier, successive Quebec governments have denied the existence and 
legitimacy of an undivided federal treaty power. What effect, if any, does 
Quebec's persistent objection have on the development of unwritten con-
stitutional laws ? Here we are catapulted far past Turpin's uncertain limits 
of the constitution. There is, quite simply, no legal answer to this question. 
Rather, there are only competing normative perspectives on the nature of 
Canadian constitutional society. I do not propose to address that fascinat-
ing and in my view increasingly urgent question here. I will say only that 
it is unfathomable to me that Quebec's long and continuing opposition to 
the existence of an undivided federal treaty power could have no effect 
whatever on the purported development of an unwritten constitutional law. 
As James Tully has brilliantly demonstrated, the principle of consent is not 
only a foundation of Canada's ancient constitutional arrangements but also 
a touchstone for future constitutional development in the post-imperial 
100. Art. 9 reads, «That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. » 
101. See J. GOLDSWORTH Y, The Sovereignty of Parliament : history and philosophy, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1999. 
102. Re Weekly Rest, précité note 55, 477. 
1122 Les Cahiers de Droit (2001) 42 C. de D. .109 
age103. In my view, Quebec's persistent objection has the effect of preclud-
ing the development of any unwritten constitutional law in favour of an 
exclusively federal treaty-making power. Thus the question cannot be re-
solved by law, but only by political dialogue between the parties leading to 
a constitutional solution. 
7 Judicial use of provincial international agreements 
In the final part of this essay I consider how, if at all, courts may make 
use of provincial international agreements in deciding cases. Treaties, be-
ing part of public international law, are judicially noticed by Canadian 
courts104. Furthermore, Canadian courts strive to construe domestic legis-
lation according to the interpretive presumption that the legislature enact-
ing the law did not intend to breach Canada's treaty obligations. I call this 
interpretive rule the treaty presumption105. A particularly potent applica-
tion of the treaty presumption was revealed in the Supreme Court of 
Canada's landmark judgment in Baker v. Canada, in which the treaty pre-
sumption was applied to a statutory grant of discretion in such a way as to 
control the exercise of administrative decision-making by reference to 
Canada's international obligations106. If we accept that provincial interna-
tional agreements are non-binding (as a matter of fact if not indisputably as 
103. J. TULLY, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
104. The leading Canadian case is the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in The North v. 
/?., [1906] 37 S.C.R. 385, 394. See also R. v. Blanco and Rios, [1992] 97 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 
86, 89 (Newf. S.C.T.D.). In English law, see Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd., [1968] 2 
Q.B. 740, 756-757, (Eng. CA.), approved by Pigeon J (dissenting) in Capital Cities Com-
munications v. C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 189-190. See also In re Queensland Mer-
cantile and Agency Company, [1892] 1 Ch. 219,226 (Eng. CA.). For secondary sources, 
see Halsbury 's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 17, London, Butterworths, 1994, paragraph 
100 ; F. A. BENNION, Statutory Interpretation : a Code, 3rd ed., London, Butterworths, 
1997, p. 624 ; A. F. BAYEFSKY, International Human Rights Law : Use in Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms Litigation, Toronto, Butterworths, 1992, pp. 138-139. 
See also E. A. DRIEDGER, The Construction of Statutes, Toronto, Butterworths, 1974, 
pp. 129-131. 
105. The leading cases are : Bloxam \. Favre, [1883] 8 P.D. 101 13 107 (Eng. C.A.;; Ahmadv. 
ILEA, [1978] 1 Q.B. 36 (Eng. CA.) per Searman LJ at 48D-E ; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.C. 
2 (File No. : 27376), para 175, citing Reference re Public Service Employee Relations 
Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 349-350 and Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. The 
leading statement of the treaty presumption in the Canadian secondary literature is Ruth 
Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed., Toronto, Butterworth, 1994, 
p. 330. For a discussion of the treaty presumption see VAN ERT, op. cit., note 51. For a 
broader discussion of the principle of international legality, of which the treaty presump-
tion is a facet, see VAN ERT op. cit., note 97, passim. 
106. For a lengthy discussion, see VAN ERT, op. cit., note 51. 
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a matter of law) and therefore are not treaties, the interpretive question 
which arises is, to what extent are non-binding provincial international 
agreements analogous to treaties for the purposes of the treaty presump-
tion? 
The rule according to which treaties are judicially noticed as law by 
Canadian courts does not extend to provincial international agreements, 
for the simple reason that they are non-binding and therefore cannot be 
sources of law. Thus, courts are not obliged to look to these non-binding 
agreements in the course of statutory interpretation. Yet such agreements 
might nevertheless be brought before the court by parties to litigation, for 
the purpose of arguing that a given provincial statute ought to be interpreted 
in the light of, and consistent with, the agreement. Such a proposition is 
not, of course, a denial of the competence of a provincial legislature to vio-
late such international commitments by enacting inconsistent laws. Provin-
cial legislatures are competent to legislate in violation of international 
law107, and are a fortiori competent to breach non-binding international 
agreements. The argument here is simply that provincial legislation should 
be presumed not to violate non-binding international agreements until clear 
intent to do so is shown, just as the treaty presumption requires that legis-
latures be presumed not to violate international treaties unless their intent 
to do so is unambiguously made out. 
The force of this argument, as regards both treaties and non-binding 
agreements, lies in its appeal to notions of legislative intent and interna-
tional comity. First, the agreement at issue may be illustrative of legislative 
intent insofar as the law under consideration was enacted either for the 
purpose of giving domestic legal effect to an agreement made between the 
province and a foreign state, or (where intent to implement the agreement 
is lacking) without clear intent to violate the agreement. Second, where the 
disputed legislation might reasonably be read as either consistent with the 
province's international commitment under a non-binding agreement or in 
breach of such an agreement, international comity requires that the Act be 
read in the light of the agreement. The courts should hesitate to find legis-
lation to be in violation of international agreements, even of a non-binding 
character, where a more favourable interpretation is available to them, for 
to do otherwise may bring the provincial government into conflict with the 
international party with whom it made the agreement. 
This analysis requires there to be sufficient ambiguity in the statutory 
language to make an interpretation consistent with the international agree-
107. Ibid. 
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ment at issue possible. Cases may arise in which the plain words of the 
provincial enactment are so clearly in violation of a provincial international 
agreement that no other reading is possible, even though no clear legisla-
tive intent to violate the agreement is otherwise apparent. In the context of 
binding international agreements (i.e., treaties), I have argued elsewhere 
that the treaty presumption should be forcefully applied in such cases to 
prevent negligent or unintentional violations of international law108. In the 
case of non-binding agreements, however, the argument for such a strained 
construction cannot stand. While a court may be justified in applying a 
strained construction to legislation in the name of international law, its jus-
tification for doing so in the name of international comity alone is much 
weaker. 
In sum, there is no constitutional or principled objection to a court 
using a non-binding international agreement to assist it in the interpreta-
tion of provincial legislation. To the contrary, considerations of legislative 
intent and international comity strongly recommend an interpretive ap-
proach informed by such agreements wherever an intent to depart from 
them is not unambiguously present in the statutory wording. The signifi-
cance of this conclusion is that, in the proper case, the interpretation of a 
provincial statute (including the interpretation of statutory authority vested 
in a provincial administrative decision-maker) may be properly influenced 
by the existence of a non-binding agreement between the provincial gov-
ernment and a foreign government or state. 
Conclusion 
Provincial international activity shows no signs of abating. As I write, 
the front-page story in one Canadian daily newspaper explains that the 
premier of Alberta, Ralph Klein, will meet with US vice-president Dick 
Cheney to discuss Alberta's role in US energy policy109. While high-level 
international meetings between provincial ministers and foreign represen-
tatives remain rare and newsworthy, mid- and low-level contact appears 
ever more frequent. It is probably only a matter of time before a Canadian 
court is forced to consider the significance of an international agreement 
arising from such an encounter. It is hoped that such a court will bring to 
this controversial question not only the international and constitutional 
considerations given here, but also a due sense of moderation, in keeping 
with Canada's federal character and international outlook. 
108. Ibid. 
109. T. OLSEN, «Klein Planning D.C. Power Play. Energy Talks With Cheney: We Are 
Gatekeepers of Our Resources, Not Ottawa», National Post, 28 May 2001. 
